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CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
Inducing Breach of Contract in Ohio'
by Arlene B. Steuer *O NE WHO, without privilege to do so, induces or otherwise
purposely causes a third person not to:
(a) perform a contract with another, or
(b) enter into or continue a business relation with another,
is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby. 2
This is a concise statement of the basis of a tort action in Ohio
today.
History
The action had its origin in the law of enticing servants from
their masters.3 In 16214 the King's Bench held one liable to
another for interfering with the other's business by threats to
those who worked for or bought from him, and this principle was
again followed in 1793.5 However, it was not until 1853, in the
decision of Lumley v. Gye,6 that recovery was allowed against
one who had induced breach of contract by mere persuasion,
without violence. In that case a singer, under contract to sing
at plaintiff's theatre, was induced by defendant, the operator of
a rival theatre, to break her contract with plaintiff. Inducement
by defendant was accomplished by persuasion, without the use
of violence or defamation. This case lays the foundation for the
* ARLENE B. STEUER received her Accounting Diploma from Fenn College
in 1948, and is now a Senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law School. From
1945 to 1949 she was employed in a Cleveland law office, and has since
1949 been employed by a railroad inspection bureau.
'This article is limited in its scope to the development in Ohio of a cause of
action for the tort of wrongfully inducing breach of contract, either by
fraud, duress, obstruction, etc., or by mere persuasion, and the extent to
which an invasion of contractual rights will be privileged by the fact that
the actor is a competitor. It is not intended to cover generally the subject
of interference with contract rights, nor the various situations under which
an actor will be privileged to interfere with another's contractual rights ex-
cept when the privilege claimed is competition. The development of this
doctrine in questions involving labor disputes, and the liability incurred for
inducing an agent to breach his fiduciary relationship with his principal are
not discussed.
2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 766 (1939).
'Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARv. L. REV. 663, 665-666 (1923).
'Garret v. Taylor, Cro. Jac. 567 (1621).
'Tarleton v. McGawley, Peake 205 (1793).
'2 E. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 1 Eng. Rug. Cas. 706 (1853).
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recognition given by courts today to a person's right to have
contract obligations fulfilled without interference by another
person not a party thereto.
The decision was followed in Bowen v. Hall,7 which also in-
volved breach of a contract for personal services. Inasmuch as
both the aforementioned cases concerned contracts for personal
services, it was questionable that the doctrine would be followed
when other types of contracts might be involved. However, in
1893 s the English court rendered a decision dispelling all belief
that an action for maliciously procuring a breach of contract was
confined to cases involving personal services, and extended the
doctrine to other contracts as well.
The principle set forth in Lumley v. Gye9 is generally followed
in American courts today. Even the few jurisdictions that fail
to give credence to this doctrine will recognize a violation of one's
rights when another induces a breach of contract by use of force,
threats or fraud.
Inducing Breach By Tortious Methods
In Ohio one of the first cases to be decided on the issue of the
right of action for inducing a breach of contract by tortious
methods was Dannerberg v. Ashley, 10 in the year 1894. Here the
plaintiff, a railroad employee, was granted a recovery against
defendant, who had exerted economic pressure" upon plaintiff's
employer to persuade the railroad to discharge him because the
plaintiff had testified against defendant in a law suit. The court
in rendering its decision cited with approval a Massachusetts
case 12 wherein the following elements were held to be necessary
prerequisites to the maintenance of such an action:
(1) . . . "Intentional and wilful acts,
(2) . . . "Calculated to cause damage to plaintiffs in their
lawful business,
6 Q. B. D. 333, 50 L. J. Q. B. 305, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 717 (1881).
'Temperton v. Russell, 1 Q. B. 715 (1893).
'See note 6 supra.
1010 Ohio C. C. 558, 5 Ohio C. Dec. 40 (1894).
'Defendant was the General Manager of The Toledo AA & NM Ry. Co.,
which railroad controlled the Toledo railroad yard. The Pennsylvania Rail-
way used this yard in Toledo for their trains by virtue of a business arrange-
ment with the railroad with which defendant was associated. By reason of
his position, defendant had special influence with the managers of the
Toledo Division of the Pennsylvania RR.
Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871).
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(3) ... "Done with the unlawful purpose to cause such
damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause
on the part of the defendant (which constitutes
malice), and
(4) . . "Actual damage for loss resulting."
Thus the Ohio courts recognized that once a valid and existing
contract was established, plaintiff would be entitled to recovery
for damages caused by a stranger's malicious and intentional in-
terference.
In 1904 an Ohio court again recognized plaintiff's right to
enjoy the benefits of his contracts without interference from a
stranger in Hillenbrand v. Building Trades Council.13 In that
case a union was held liable for coercing plaintiff's employees to
break their contracts with plaintiff. The sole purpose of the
union's action was to injure plaintiff's business, and thus compel
him to accede to the union's demands. This was declared to be
an unlawful purpose.
In 190914 the court intimated that a party would be guilty of
an actionable wrong when by fraudulent statement'r he induced
a third party to breach his contract.
The most recent Ohio decision' 6 deals with a situation wherein
defendant prevented a third party from performing his contract
with plaintiff. In the case of Reichman v. Drake plaintiff entered
into a lease with the owner of certain premises, which lease con-
tained a provision that possession would be given when the in-
cumbent tenant, the defendant, vacated the premises. The owner
of the building informed defendant of this lease, but when de-
fendant's term of tenancy expired, he failed and refused to move
for several months thereafter, thereby causing plaintiff certain
aHosea (Ohio) 327, 14 Ohio Dec. (N. P.) 628 (1904).
"Allen v. Sinning, 20 Ohio Dec. 101, 8 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 201 (1909).
"Defendant was indebted to plaintiff on four promissory notes secured by
a mortgage on defendant's property. Upon maturity plaintiff sought recovery
on the notes and foreclosure of the mortgage. Defendant counter-claimed,
seeking damage for slander of title, and alleging the following: -Defendant
had entered into an agreement with a third party to sell the mortgaged
property and satisfy the amount due on the promissory notes from the pro-
ceeds of the sale; upon discovering the foregoing, plaintiff induced the
prospective purchaser to breach the contract by misrepresenting to her that
defendant's title to said property was not good; Defendant's title was good,
but he was unable to find another purchaser for the property. The court
held that the facts did not constitute a good counter-claim to plaintiff's
action, but that defendant would have a good cause of action in a separate
suit on the principle of interference with contract relations.
" Reichman v. Drake, 89 Ohio App. 222 (1951).
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damages. The court held that as defendant had purposely, and
without privilege, prevented the owner from carrying out his
contractual obligations with the plaintiff, he would be liable for
all damages thereby caused the plaintiff.
Inducing Breach By Persuasion
It is clear from the cases cited in the foregoing section that
Ohio courts will afford relief when plaintiff's contractual rights
are interfered with by a third person through the use of fraud,
duress, coercion, and obstruction. Ohio courts state that relief
will be granted when a party to a contract with plaintiff has been
persuaded by defendant not to perform, providing defendant
has no justification for his acts. However, inducement of the
breach must be proven to the court's satisfaction.
It is necessary that plaintiff prove the defendant's invasion
of his contract rights to be intentional and malicious before re-
covery will be allowed. But the interpretation of the terms in-
tentional and malicious given by the courts is somewhat dif-
ferent than one might suppose at first glance.
By malice is meant an "intentional doing of a harmful act
without legal justification or excuse" 17; or as used in connection
with inducing breach of contract, "Malice * * * denotes un-
justified interference with the contractual relationship" as dis-
tinguished from ill will or spite on the part of the actor.ls
As the malice meant is legal malice and not ill will, the fact
that the action is motivated by spite toward the plaintiff will not
create liability on defendant's part if he is in the lawful exercise
of an absolute right. This is illustrated in Lancaster v. Ham-
burger.19 The plaintiff was a streetcar conductor, and defendant
several times threatened to see to it that plaintiff lost his job. In
keeping with his threats, defendant reported every infraction by
plaintiff of the rules of his job to plaintiff's superintendent, as a
result of which plaintiff lost his job. The court held that where
one is in the exercise of a clear legal right or performance of a
duty, the motive prompting his action is immaterial. Motive is
important only where defendant is committing a wrongful act. 20
"Id. at 228.
18 Ibid.
"70 Ohio St. 156 (1904).
"Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861);
Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73 (1896);
Kelley v. The Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 327 (1897).
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The fact that defendant has knowledge of plaintiff's contract
rights, and subsequently aids a third party in breaching his con-
tract with the plaintiff, has been held not to be an intentional
invasion unless defendant's acts were the motivating factor in
inducing the third party to commit the breach. In Uihlein v.
Cincinnati Car Company,21 the Court of Appeals of Hamilton
County found that plaintiff must allege malice in its petition.
The court held that merely alleging that the defendant was a
party to a conspiracy to aid and abet a corporation in violating its
contract with the plaintiff was insufficient; that it was necessary
to allege and prove that defendant had actually induced the
breach by the corporation.
In the same year the Uihlein decision was rendered, the court,
in Weinberg v. Schaller,22 held that a finding of fact by a jury
that the defendant induced the breach, or in the alternative par-
ticipated in the breach of the contract, was insufficient to support
a verdict for plaintiff. A mere participation in breaching a. con-
tract by one not a party to the contract was not enough to impose
liability.
But contrast the Uihlein and Weinberg decisions with one
rendered in 1921 by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 6th
District.23 Plaintiff in this case was in the business of selling
acetylene gas in tanks. In the sales contracts with its customers
plaintiff reserved the title to the tanks, and the exclusive right to
refill the empty tanks. Defendant, an operator of the same type
of business, knowingly assisted and encouraged plaintiff's cus-
tomers to violate their contracts with plaintiff by having the
tanks refilled with gas by defendant. It was held that where
there is convincing evidence that defendants are actively as-
sisting and encouraging customers to violate their contracts with
plaintiff, this is an actionable wrong.
Also, compare the foregoing cases with the advanced view
set forth in a recent English case, 24 wherein the court held that
when a person knowingly and without justification actively
facilitates a breach of contract, and thereby causes damage, he is
guilty of the tort of procurement of breach of contract. The
plaintiff was a trade association whose members had agreed that,
'34 Ohio App. 52 (1929).
34 Ohio App. 464 (1929).
Auto Acetylene Light Co. v. Prest-O-Lite Co., 276 Fed. 537 (6th Cir. 1921),
cert. denied 258 U. S. 662, 77 L. Ed. 795, 52 Sup. Ct. 314 (1922).
" British Motor Trade Association v. Salvadori, et al., 1 Ch. 556 (1949).
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in an effort to curb inflation in the price of new automobiles,
caused by the scarcity of new cars in England, all purchasers
would be required to execute a covenant agreeing not to resell
for a period of twelve months after purchase. Defendants were
dealers who sold above the price levels set by the association.
The cars offered by them for sale to the public were obtained
from persons who had, in turn, induced customers of plaintiff's
members to breach the covenant in their sales contracts by resell-
ing the cars to such persons. Defendant also obtained cars from
people who had purchased new cars and executed the covenants
for the express purpose of resale at a profit, thereby breaching
their contracts with the trade association dealers. It should be
noted that the defendant dealers did not themselves actually pro-
cure the breaches of contract. The court differentiates between
inducing a breach and interference with a contract. It discusses
the statement made by Lord MacNghten in Quinn v. Leathem25
that "It is a violation of legal rights to interfere with contractual
relations recognized by law if there be no sufficient justification
for the interference." The court states that it believes Lord Mac-
Nghten made a deliberate use of the word interference in prefer-
ence to the word inducing. With that decision in mind, the court
held that active inducement of the breach was not necessary, but
any active step taken by the defendant having knowledge of the
covenant by which he facilitates a breach of the covenant is suf-
ficient. This is probably one of the most advanced decisions on
this question in either the American or English courts.
While Ohio courts will not hold a defendant liable for merely
aiding and assisting another to breach his contract with plaintiff,
an actor will be held liable as a principal when he knowingly and
intentionally aids and abets a conspiracy to induce a breach of
contract in violation of plaintiff's rights. 26
Justification (Privilege)
Thus far consideration has been given only to situations where
a third party's interference with plaintiff's contractual rights was
unjustified. It has been illustrated that a person will always be
held liable for unjustified and intentional interference with plain-
tiff's contractual rights, whether by coercive methods or mere
-(1901) A. C. 495, 510.
"Hillenbrand v. Building Trades Council, Hosea (Ohio), 327, 14 Ohio Dec.
(N. P.) 628 (1904).
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solicitation. The rule is well set forth in Sterling and Welch Com-
pany v. Duke27 that "it is unlawful to pursue any course of con-
duct the sole purpose of which is to induce breach of contract."
Not all acts of solicitation, however, are unlawful, and the fact
that the actor is a competitor of plaintiff will justify certain of his
acts. The question is, how far will the privilege of competition
extend in justifying a person's acts?
The interest one has in having contractual obligations fulfilled
is superior to the freedom of action of a competitor to enter into
contractual relations with a third party, if to do so he must ac-
tively solicit a breach of an existing contract. To this extent one's
right to deter a third party from dealing with another is qualified.
But the courts draw a fine line as to how far a competitor may go.
For instance, C, a competitor, is not prohibited from continuing
to solicit B's future business in the normal course, by advertising
and other usual methods, even though he knows of an existing
contract between A and B. In Ohio C is not prevented from en-
tering into a contract with B, even though C knows that to fulfill
such contract it will be necessary for B to breach an existing con-
tract with A. However, C must not set out with the purpose in
mind of inducing B to breach his contract with A in order to ac-
complish his own ends; that is, C must not be the motivating force
in inducing B's breach of his contract with A. The gist of the ac-
tion is not that C sought to advance his own interests by lawful
means, as a result of which A, a competitor, was injured. If
this were the case, our competitive form of doing business would
be at an end. But when C sets out with the wrongful intent of
advancing his own interests by endeavoring to appropriate the
contract rights of A to himself, a recovery will be given A for
C's interference should C succeed in his endeavors.
It becomes apparent, therefore, that the court in each case
must determine what was in the actor's mind, that is, what was
his intent at the time of his actions. In determining the actor's
intent the court may be aided by whatever outward manifesta-
tions of his purpose can be adduced in evidence by the plaintiff.
How liberal courts will be in their determinations is illustrated
in Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co.28 Plaintiff was a Chevrolet
dealer and the owner of an agency contract with the defendant,
Chevrolet Motor Co., terminable upon a certain time notice.
'The Sterling & Welch Co. v. Marie Duke, et al., 33 Ohio Op. 482 (1946).
171 Minn. 260, 214 N. W. 754 (1927), 84 A. L. R. 35 (annotated pgs. 43-100).
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Plaintiff alleged that the defendant, Sander, was also an automo-
bile dealer, and that he conspired and agreed with the corpora-
tion to take away plaintiff's business. As a result, plaintiff alleged,
the defendant corporation breached its contract with plaintiff
without notice, and gave the dealership to Sander. The court
held that Sander had a perfect right to negotiate and make an
agency contract with defendant corporation, and the fact that
plaintiff was thereby injured would not make Sander's actions
wrongful. But the court further determined that the sole purpose
of Sander's actions was to deprive plaintiff of the benefits of the
contract, and of his established business. In answer to the defense
of competition, the court stated that Sander's desire to appro-
priate the business to himself only accentuated the inherent
wrongfulness of Sander's contract. 2sa The theory of the court is
that "the right to competition is not the right to destroy con-
tractual rights." 29
In Horth v. American Aggregates Corporation0 the Ohio Ap-
pellate Court for Darke County faced a similar situation. Plaintiff
had entered into a contract with a Cable Company to furnish
certain supplies should the Cable Company obtain a contract
from the Government. Upon obtaining such contract from the
Government, the Cable Company entered into negotiations with
defendant to furnish the necessary supplies. Defendant's agents
had personal knowledge of the existence of plaintiff's contract.
In addition plaintiff had notified the defendant prior to con-
summation of defendant's contract with the Cable Company that
it would be held liable by plaintiff for damages suffered as the
result of any breach by Cable Company of its contract. The court
briefly discussed the Sorenson case in its opinion, but pointed out
that such was an action merely to determine whether or not the
"' In a dissenting opinion, Stone, J. pointed out that the action exists to
compensate for unjustified or wrongful interference by defendant with
contractual rights. Here Sanders was not proven guilty of any wrongful
intent, as he had the right to want to advance his own business interests.
His conduct was justified because Sanders was promoting his own interests,
in a lawful manner, in a competitive business. Stone's position is that this
case has the effect of letting the court's decision turn on its determination
of the state of mind and intent of the actor at the time of soliciting business
for himself; of creating a tort out of defendant's admission that he hoped,
by his solicitation of business, to obtain immediate benefits rather thanfuture benefits. The result, Stone asserts, is to penalize the truthful and
reward the dishonest.
Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N. E. 817 (1907).
"31 Ohio L. Abs. 331 (1940).
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petition stated a cause of action; that in the case under discussion
there was a total absence of any evidence supporting plaintiff's
petition on the issue of a wilful inducement by the defendant.
The court adopted the theory set forth in the Restatement of the
Law of Torts31 that-
"It is not a malicious inducement of a breach of contract for a
person to enter into an agreement with another person with
knowledge that such other person has a contract with a third
person covering the same subject matter, and that both con-
tracts cannot be performed."
Proof must be brought forth by the plaintiff that defendant in-
duced the third party to breach his contract with plaintiff.
The next case to be decided along these lines was in 1943. 3 2
Two route drivers for a milk company had executed contracts
with the company, by the terms of which they agreed to refrain
from soliciting any customers on their routes for a period of six
months after their employment by the company terminated. The
company sold its business to the plaintiff milk company, and "as-
signed" the driver's contracts. The drivers worked for the plain-
tiff, but refused to sign employment contracts containing such a
restrictive clause with the plaintiff. After a period of six months
they left plaintiff's employ, went to work for the defendant, a
rival milk company, and began soliciting all their former custo-
mers from plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged in its suit against the de-
fendant that it entered into a conspiracy with the route men
with the unlawful purpose and intention of appropriating the
good will purchased by plaintiff; that to accomplish this purpose
defendant corporation solicited the route men and other em-
ployees of plaintiff to work for them. The court found that em-
ployment contracts are personal, and not assignable without con-
sent of the employees; that, therefore, the route men were em-
ployed on a week-to-week basis, which contract was terminable
at will. As defendant was a competitor, it was (as will be shown
infra) justified in soliciting the route men to work for it. Further,
the court did not find from the evidence that defendant induced
the route men to breach their employment contracts. The court
further found the route men had fulfilled their original contracts
to refrain from soliciting their former customers, by waiting for
six months after the sale by the former company to plaintiff. As
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 766, comment i (1939).
"Pestel Milk Co. v. Model Dairy Products Co., 39 Ohio L. Abs. 197 (1943).
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they had never signed new contracts to that effect with plaintiff,
there were no breaches of this covenant by the route men. The
court notes in passing that plaintiff was careless in not heeding
the warning constantly before it in the form of the route men's
refusal to sign such a contract with it. But having determined
that there was no contract breached with plaintiff by the route
men, the court could not hold defendant responsible for induc-
ing a non-existent breach.
Had there been any breach of this covenant by the route men,
the outcome might have been different, for the court states in its
opinion that it is not in sympathy with a firm that seeks to pro-
mote its own interests by soliciting aid from former employees of
its rival to acquire an unfair advantage. Nevertheless, the court
makes it clear that it will not presume or imply a malicious in-
tent on the part of defendant at the time of its actions, but that
the burden is upon the plaintiff to show this by substantial evi-
dence in order to maintain its action.
Contracts Terminable At Will
The fact that a contract is terminable at will does not justify
a malicious and unprivileged inducement of a third party to
breach such contract. A stranger to a contract cannot assert that
inasmuch as the parties to a contract had an absolute right to ter-
minate it, he had an equally absolute right to persuade either of
the parties to exercise that right. A contract terminable at the
will of either of the contracting parties does not make it ter-
minable at the will of a third party.33 The contracting parties
have a mutual interest in the freedom of the exercise of each
other's judgment in terminating or continuing their contractual
relations without unjustified interference or compulsion by a
third party. This interest will be protected by Ohio courts.34
An important difference arises, however, between contracts
for a definite period or purpose and those terminable at will in
determining whether or not a privilege for the actor's conduct
exists. Professor Carpenter, in his article on Interference with
Contract Relations3 5 has made the broad statement that "com-
petition gives a privilege intentionally to invade interests in con-
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7 (1915).
,Dannerberg v. Ashley, 10 Ohio C. C. 558, 5 Ohio C. Dec. 40 (1894).
"Carpenter, Interference with Contracts Relations, 41 HARv. L. REV. 728, 763(1927).
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol1/iss1/6
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
tracts terminable at will." The Restatement of Torts36 also as-
serts that one is privileged purposely to induce a third person
not to continue a business relationship with a competitor of the
actor, but then qualifies its statement by saying that:
(1) The actor must not use improper means;
(2) The relationship must concern a matter involving the
competition between the actor and competitor;
(3) The actor must not intend thereby to create or continue
an illegal restraint of competition; and
(4) The actor must be motivated in part at least by his de-
sire to advance his interest in the competition.
The privilege is based upon the reasoning that every man has at
least an equal right of freedom to negotiate and contract by use
of proper means, and that such freedom promotes efficiency and
service in business, and therefore inures to the benefit of the
public.
The limitation in (2) above is promulgated for the obvious
reason that when business or contracts are obtained by exerting
an influence outside the sphere of the relationship about which
the competition revolves, better business methods and service
are not promoted. The exact opposite may be true, and the busi-
ness may be obtained despite the fact that the public might be
better served elsewhere.
The requirement in (4) exists for the equally apparent reason
that no purpose will be served by aiding one to establish a busi-
ness enterprise for the sole purpose of driving another out of
business, with the intent of discontinuing the enterprise im-
mediately upon the gratification of the actor's ill will toward the
competitor.
Business Relationships
Not Yet Cemented By Contract
In 1944 a proposition new to the annals of Ohio case law was
decided in Leibovitz v. Central National Bank.3 7 The plaintiff
was the proprietress of a candy and cigar stand located in the
building owned by defendant bank. She had received an offer
for the sale of her business. The evidence establishes that the
sale would have been consummated but for the unjustified inter-
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 768 (1) (1939).
" 75 Ohio App. 25, 30 Ohio Op. 288, 60 N. E. 2d 727 (1944).
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ference by defendant, which set the purchase price at a sum less
than the amount offered as a condition to accepting the purchaser
as a tenant. Plaintiff sued defendant for the difference between
the price obtained for the business and the original offer. The
court held that defendant's conduct in maliciously inducing a per-
son not to enter into a contract with another, where the evidence
clearly establishes that such contract would have been consum-
mated but for such wrongful interference, is an actionable wrong.
The court will hold the defendant liable to parties to such con-
tract for any damages sustained as a result of defendant's inter-
ference.
Remedy
In Ohio it is clear that even when there is a legal remedy,
equity will grant an injunction against a defendant, restraining
him from further inducing any breach of plaintiff's contractual
rights, or from engaging in any conspiracy for this purpose, where
there is- (1) an injury which threatens an irreparable damage,
or (2) a continuing injury when the legal remedy therefor may
involve a multiplicity of suits. 38
Where defendant has already accomplished his purpose, and
the breach of contract is complete, a court will not grant an in-
junction against such breach, but will limit plaintiff to his dam-
ages at law. This is particularly true where the contract has
subsequently been given to a third party, and the injunction
would have the effect of causing a breach of this latter contract.
The court states that "the function of injunction is to afford
preventive relief, not to redress wrongs already committed. '39
Comment
The purpose of creating the tort in question was to establish a
certain degree of economic stability by protecting from inter-
ference by a third party the reasonable expectation of having con-
tractual obligations performed. Against this purpose must be
balanced the rights of a competitor to advance his own business
interests by lawful means. However, a competitor should never
"Central Metal Products Corp. v. O'Brien, et al., 278 Fed. 827 (N. D. Ohio
1922); Auto Acetylene Light Co. v. Prest-O-Lite Co., supra, note 21; The
Sterling & Welch Co. v. Marie Duke, et al., 33 Ohio Op. 482 (1946); Hillen-
brand v. Building Trades Council, Hosea (Ohio) 327, 14 Ohio Dec. (N. P.)
628 (1904).
"J. C. McFarland Co. v. O'Brien, et al., 6 F. 2d 1016 (N. D. Ohio 1925).
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be allowed intentionally to invade another's contract rights in an
endeavor to further his own interests.
It will be noted that while Ohio gives lip service to the fore-
going principles, to date no recovery has been granted to a plain-
tiff in such an action unless defendant has accomplished his pur-
pose by unlawful means, or there has been an obvious inter-
ference without any excuse whatsoever by defendant, as in the
Leibovitz40 case. Yet on the facts almost every case presented in
this article, which was adversely decided by the Ohio courts,
might have been decided the other way in a different jurisdiction.
This is due to the almost impossible burden of proof imposed
upon plaintiff by the Ohio courts. The courts have stated they
will not imply a malicious intent on the part of the defendant from
his actions; that mere knowledge of an existing contract will not
prevent a defendant from soliciting the business which is the sub-
ject matter of the contract, nor from entering into a contract with
a third party which will prevent his performance of his contract
with the plaintiff. How else may a plaintiff prove defendant's
intent, except perhaps by obtaining an admission from the defend-
ant or from the party induced by the defendant-a very unlikely
occurrence.
Surely it should be recognized by the courts that it is de-
fendant's unjustified interference from which plaintiff is to be
protected, and the inducement should be implied from the fact
that a defendant has solicited and consummated a contract with
a third party with knowledge that plaintiff's contractual rights
and expectancies would thereby be frustrated. In view of the
rights sought to be protected, it would seem that the decisions
rendered in the cases cited herein from the Federal court 41 and
other jurisdictions4 2 are more equitable, and recovery should be
granted upon proof of defendant's intentional and unjustified
interference with plaintiff's contractual rights rather than induce-
ment of a breach thereof.
Summary
From the Ohio cases cited herein, the following principles of
law may be drawn:
4075 Ohio App. 25, 30 Ohio Op. 288, 60 N. E. 2d 727 (1944).
"Auto Acetylene Light Co. v. Prest-O-Lite Co., supra note 21.
" Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., supra note 26; British Motor Trade
Association v. Salvadori, et al., supra note 22.
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I. Contract for a definite
period of time or purpose
(a) Where the evidence shows that defendant purposely and
without privilege induced a third party to breach his contract
with the plaintiff, or prevented its performance, the defendant
will be liable to plaintiff for the damages caused him thereby.
(b) The court will not imply from the fact that the defendant
assisted a third party or participated with him in breaching his
contract with the plaintiff that the defendant maliciously induced
the breach. Plaintiff must prove that defendant intentionally
induced a third party to breach his contract with plaintiff, or that
defendant was a party to a conspiracy for the purpose of inducing
a third party to breach his contract.
(c) Where the plaintiff proves that the defendant has ma-
liciously induced a third party to breach a contract with the
plaintiff, it may be inferred from Ohio case law that competition
will not constitute such a privilege as will excuse the defendant
for invading the contractual obligations owed to the plaintiff.
However, it must be noted that an actor's intent is usually a
difficult thing to prove, and the Ohio courts have demanded that
plaintiff produce clear evidence of defendant's intent before they
will grant a recovery. To date there is no Ohio decision in point
where it has been proven to the court's satisfaction that the de-
fendant was the procuring cause of the breach.
II. A contract terminable at will
(a) Where the defendant's action is not privileged, a wrong-
ful and intentional interference will constitute an actionable
wrong for which he will be held liable.
(b) Where the actor claims the privilege of competition, this
would seem to be sufficient justification for inducing another, by
proper means, not to continue a business relation with plaintiff,
and the injury suffered by plaintiff is damnum absque injuria.
III. A relationship that will
terminate in a contract
(a) Where the evidence clearly indicates that a contract
would have been consummated between the plaintiff and a third
party but for the interference of the defendant, and such inter-
ference is intentional and without justification, the defendant will
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be held liable for all damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason
of the defendant's wrongful action.
(b) If the actor is a competitor, this fact would undoubtedly
justify his actions, providing he did not resort to improper means
to influence the third party.
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